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Wall: The Argentine Close Corporation: A Vehicle for Equity Investment
THE ARGENTINE CLOSE CORPORATION: A VEHICLE FOR
EQUITY INVESTMENT AS A MINORITY STOCKHOLDER
DUANE

D.

WALL*

American companies investing abroad frequently do so through participation in a joint venture with a partner from the country in which the
investment is being made., As a matter of investment policy, many of these
companies demand a majority interest in the stock of the corporation through
which their investment is being channeled on the theory that the most
effective means of protecting their investment is through voting control of
the enterprise.2 However, an increasing number of companies are demonstrating a willingness to accept a minority interest in the voting stock. 3 This
article is devoted to a consideration of the close corporation in Argentina from
the viewpoint of an American company making an equity investment as a
minority stockholder, emphasis being placed upon control of corporate action
by such a stockholder and the devices through which control may be obtained.4
DIFFERENCES IN UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINE CORPORATE LAW

The Argentine corporation (sociedad an6nima) is similar to its United
States counterpart in that both have the attributes ordinarily associated with
the corporate concept: power to take, hold, and convey property in the corporate name; centralization of management in the board of directors; ready
*J.D. 1965, University of Oklahoma; LL.M. 1966, New York University; Member of the
Bars of Oklahoma and New York.
1. For an extensive survey of the use of the international joint venture by American
companies see W. FRIEDMANN k G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURFS
(1961). Of special interest is the collection of case studies of the joint venture in South
America. Id. at 281.
2. W. FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF, supra note 1, at 107.
3. Blough, Joint International Business Ventures in Less Developing Countries, 2 INST.
PRIVATE INVESM,IENTs ABROAD AND FOREIGN TRADE 513 (1960). Some companies believe that the
participation of local capital helps achieve recognition as a local company in the community. Id. at 518. In other instances, managerial functions such as sales distribution may
be handled better by a local partner. Id. at 529.
4. This article considers only means of control provided within the legal framework of
the Argentine corporate structure. Often the most effective type of control flows from
economical leverage, e.g., control of sources of future finance or technological know-how.
Blough, supra note 3, at 532. Various types of nonequity investments are also available
and should always be considered in planning to do business abroad: agency agreements;
franchise and brand-use agreements; management, training, and technical service agreements; construction and job performance agreements; licensing of patents, trademarks, know-

how, technical assistance, and research results.

MAW, JOINT VENTURES ABROAD-FORMS AND

COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 171
(1965).
For a useful checklist of items that should be considered in planning an international
joint venture see 2 H. LAUNDAU, DOING BUSINESS ABROAD app. A (1962); Brudno, Basic
Questions in Foreign Trade and Investment-A Lawyer's Checklist, 3 INST. PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD AND FOREIGN TRADE 5 (1961).
METHODS,

NEGOTIATING

AND

DRAFTING

INTERNATIONAL
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transferability of shares; perpetual existence; 5 and limited liability. Within
this framework, the term "dose corporation" may be broadly defined as a
corporation whose shares are not sold in the securities market.
Although corporate law in Argentina and the United States is remarkably
similar in many respects, there are differences of corporate law and practice
between the two countries, and these, to the extent they may directly or
indirectly affect corporate control, deserve specific consideration in order to
provide a background for the subsequent discussion of control mechanisms.
Formationof the Sociedad An6nima
The sociedad an6nima is incorporated under provisions of the Code of
Commerce applicable throughout the Argentine Republic,6 rather than under
statutes enacted by the provinces.7 As part of the process of incorporation,
both the charter and bylaws of the sociedad an6nima must be submitted for
approval by the Inspeccion General de Justicia, which is the governmental
agency charged with the regulation of corporations. The Code of Commerce
has not been modified substantially since its enactment in 1889, and because
its provisions have been inadequate to deal with evolving corporate practices, the Inspeccion General has been forced to use its regulatory powers,
in effect, to create corporate law. Such regulations often determine what may
be included in the corporate charter and bylaws. For example, the Code of
Commerce does not prohibit shares of common stock without voting rights,
but the Inspeccion General will not approve a corporate charter containing
such shares.8 Argentine scholars may dispute whether the Inspeccion General
has the power to establish such a provision, but-the regulation is complied
with in practice.
In determining what control mechanisms may by included in the charter
and bylaws, the investor must inquire not only concerning applicable statutes,
but regarding the regulations of the Inspeccion General. A good local counsel
will be informed about current corporate practices and the position taken
toward such practices by the Inspeccion General. Such counsel should be able
to predict whether any given control mechanism will be approved, and the
investor at times will be forced to rely upon his prediction in planning a
scheme of corporate control.
Minimum Number of Stockholders. The Code of Commerce calls for a
minimum of ten stockholders for the formation of a sociedad an6nima9 and
in the opinion of most Argentine scholars this minimum number must be
maintained throughout its life. This requirement presents an obvious legal
5. In Argentina, a corporation must have a definite duration. The term of 99 years is
commonly used and the term may be extended upon its expiration.
6. Codigo de Comercio arts. 318-71 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Code of Commerce].
7. The Argentine Constitution establishes a federal system of government, a province
being the equivalent of a state in the United States.
8. HALPEMN, SocmnAs ANONIMAS 129 (1958) (all translations are those of the author).
9. Code of Commerce §318 (1967).
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obstacle if the sociedad an6nima in which an American company wishes to
invest contemplates fewer than ten stockholders. One method of avoiding
the requirement is through the issuance of bearer shares?10 The ownership
of such shares is not recorded in the corporate books, and proof of the existence of fewer than ten stockholders is almost impossible. Of course, if
fewer than ten stockholders consistently appear to vote at stockholders'
meetings, an inference could be drawn that the minimum requirement has
been violated. This inference may be prevented by the use of nominees at
stockholders' meetings in order to create the appearance that the minimum
requirement has been met. If the sociedad an6nima issues nominative shares,
then holders of such shares may be forced to simulate transfer of such shares
to their nominees in order to have the required number of stockholders.
The issuance of bearer shares is probably the most commonly used means
of avoiding the requirement that the sociedad an6nima have ten stockholders.
However, no restrictions may be placed upon the transfer of bearer shares."
If the scheme of corporate control involves restricting the alienation of shares,
then the shares that are so restricted must be nominative.
Statutory Limitations on Voting Rights. Section 350 of the Code of
Commerce provides that no stockholder, whatever the number of shares he
possesses, may represent more than ten per cent of the total votes conferred
by outstanding stock for the purpose of constituting a quorum at a stockholders' meeting, nor may he cast more than twenty per cent of the votes
present at the meeting. The purpose of this provision is to protect minority
stockholders by limiting the number of votes that a majority stockholder may
cast.
According to the interpretation placed upon section 350 by an Argentine
court,1 2 if a sociedad an6nima has one class of common stock whose shares

are entitled to one vote each, one stockholder having sixty of these shares
and the other having forty, each one may only represent ten shares for
the purpose of constituting a quorum. Since twenty shares entitled to twenty
votes would then be represented at the meeting, each stockholder could cast
four votes. This procedure would in effect provide equality between the two
stockholders.
In practice, the provisions of section 350 would be avoided in the above
situation by the transfer of shares of stock (whether in bearer or nominative
form) by the sixty per cent stockholder to various nominees, who would
then appear at the stockholders' meeting and vote the shares according to

10.

For a general discussion of bearer shares see Note, Corporations: Bearer Shares in

the United States: Civil Law Contrast: Connecticut and Montana Statutes Authorizing Issuance, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 174 (1962). One use of such shares is to avoid rules in South American countries prohibiting foreign ownership of broadcasting stations and other enterprises
considered of national interest by the country promulgating the rules. Id. at 184 n.65.
11. I. HALPERIN, supra note 8, at 126 n.54. This rule is based on the idea that the
essence of the bearer share is its transferability by delivery.
12. Union Cafieros Azucareros Villa Alberdi Lrda., Suprema Corte de Tucuman, 20
Instancia, 61 La Ley 303 (1951).
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his wishes. In theory, such concealment could void the votes cast by the
nominees, but such concealment is almost impossible to establish; consequently, the appointment of nominees is commonly used to avoid the requirements of section 350.
Syndic. By statute,13 each sociedad an6nima must have a syndic who is
elected each year by the stockholders. In theory, the syndic protects the interests of minority stockholders and is charged with the duties of examining
the corporate books and documents at least once every three months, calling
stockholders' meetings when the board of directors refuses to do so, attending
the meetings of the board of directors, supervising the management of the
corporation, frequently checking the cash balances, and giving his opinion
regarding the inventory and balance sheet.' 4 In practice, the syndic is elected
by simple majority vote of the stockholders unless the charter or bylaws call
for a higher majority, and for this reason his election does not always provide effective protection of minority stockholders.
Alternate Business Form: The Sociedad de ResponsabilidadLimitada (SRL)
The provisions of the Code of Commerce pertaining to sociedad an6nimas
were not drafted in contemplation of the now well accepted concept of the
cldose corporation as an incorporated partnership, a fact evidenced by a consideration of the policies underlying the items discussed in the preceding
section.
The principal objective for the regulation by the Inspeccion General and
the syndic is the protection of minority stockholders in sociedad an6nimas
whose shares are widely distributed among the public. In the sociedad an6nima owned entirely by a few stockholders, each stockholder takes a more
active part in its management and control and can rely upon his own supervision for his protection. The requirement that each sociedad an6nima have
at least ten stockholders obviously is not suited to ownership of the entity by
a smaller number of people.'The evident need in Argentina for a business form more consonant with
the needs of small businesses led to the enactment, in 1932, of the statute
authorizing the creation of the sociedad de responsabilidad limitada (SRL),
which is essentially a partnership with the added attribute of limited
liability. 16

13. Code of Commerce art. 340 (1967).
14. M. La Vega, Argentina, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVEsTmENT 7 (W.
&R. Pugh eds. 1959).
15. Before the creation by statute of the SRL, if fewer than ten persons
organize a corporation, the requirement of a minimum of ten stockholders was
fied by the gift of a few shares of stock to relatives of the stockholders or to
1 M.

R IVAROLA, SocIEDADEs ANONIMAS

Friedmann
wanted to
often satisemployees.

61 (1941).

16. Ley 11.645 (Oct. 8, 1932), 1 [1966] Anuario 252 [hereinafter cited as Law 11.645].
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The SRL has several advantages over the sociedad an6nima, the primary
ones being the simplicity of its formation, the informality of its management,
and the lack of government regulation of its activities. The Inspeccion General has no supervisory authority over the SRL. In view of these advantages,
one Argentine lawyer has advised that it provides the most convenient form
of investment for amounts of capital in the neighborhood of 60,000 dollars.' 7
However, the SRL has several attributes that often make it unsuitable as a
vehicle for the investment of even limited amounts of capital.
Maximum Membership. The SRL can initially have no more than twenty
members. Five members may be added subsequent to formation if they are
employees.' At times an American company may want to use the corporate
form for its investment, but may desire to issue stock to more than twenty
persons, especially if any type of stock option plan is contemplated.
Capitalization. The SRL can have only one class of capital. This prevents
a capitalization with the flexibility that may be attained by the creation of
both common and preferred stock in the corporation. A sociedad an6nima
may issue preferred shares, which only confer voting rights upon their holders
if no dividends are paid to such holders for a period of two years.19 Such
stock may be given a preference to dividends, distribution in liquidation, or
both; any may be either participating or nonparticipating. This offers a
great deal of flexibility in affording a stockholder the right to participate in
the profits of the corporation without sharing in its control unless there is
a default in the payment of dividends.
Voting Rights. Each member of the SRL is entitled to a number of votes
equal to the number of shares owned in the SRL.20 This voting scheme does

not provide the flexibility that may be attained in the corporation by the
creation of a class or classes of stock whose shares confer the right to multiple
2

votes. "

Negotiability of Ownership Interests. The ownership interests in an SRL
may not be represented by negotiable certificates. -2 In addition, the law spe17.

M. La Vega, supra note 14, at 4.

18. Law 11.645, §8, 1 [1966] Anuario 252.
19. E. Zalvidar, Sindicatos de Acciones, 92 La Ley (Secci6n Doctrina) 983 (1958).
20. Law 11.645, §19, 1 [1966] Anuario 252.

21. H. ALEGRIA, SOCIEDADES ANONIMAS 58 (1963). If a majority and minority stockholder
are contributing 80% and 20% of the capital, respectively, they may be given the right to a
proportionate share in the corporate profits by the creation of two classes of stock: Class
A composed of 80 shares and Class B composed of 20 shares. At the same time, they may be
given voting power disproportionate to their capital contributions by providing in the
bylaws that Class A stock is entitled to one vote per share and Class B stock is entitled
to two votes per share. In this manner, if the bylaws provide that action by stockholders
may only be taken by a majority composed of 75% of the votes outstanding, the minority
stockholder would have the veto over stockholder action because he would have shares
representing more than 25% of the votes. This is only one example of the flexibility of the
capital structure available through use of multiple-vote shares.
22.

Law 11.645, §9, 1 [1966] Anuario 252.
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cifically requires that the contract creating the SRL list the amount of capital
contributed by each member and that the contract be published in the Boletin Oficial.23 These rules prevent the issue of bearer shares, which many investors prefer because of the anonymity they provide.
Restrictions on Transfer of Ownership Interests. If the SRL has five or
fewer participants, each one may transfer his interest in the enterprise only
upon the unanimous consent of the others. 24 Often, an investor may want
to have shares that are readily transferable, or, if not, to impose another
type of restriction.
In view of the advantages offered by the SRL, any American company
investing in Argentina should consider it as a form of doing business. This
article is written from the viewpoint of the investor who has considered
the SRL but found it unsuitable for his purposes for one or more of the
above-mentioned reasons.
CORPORATE CONTROL MECHANISMS NOT AvAILABLE IN ARGENTINA

In approaching the question of how to protect his investment through the
control of corporate decisions, an investor must first determine which decisions he desires to control. Then he must determine which organ within
the sociedad an6nima has the power to make such decisions. This determination is important because the practice in Argentina may differ from the
practice in the United States. In Argentina, for example, the power to declare
dividends is reserved to the stockholders, 5 while in the United States it is
generally conferred upon the board of directors. After this determination is
made, the investor must ascertain what specific mechanisms are available
for control of the organ having the power to make the decisions he wishes
to influence and must make inquiry regarding the documents in which such
mechanisms may be included. In the United States, two of the most common control distribution devices, in addition to the corporate charter and bylaws, are the stockholders' agreement and the voting trust.2 6 In Argentina,
the latter two devices are either not valid or, if valid, cannot be specifically
enforced.
Stockholders' Agreement. An agreement among the stockholders to vote
their shares in the manner specified in the agreement is a common device in
the United States, especially to provide for the election of the corporate directors.27 In Argentina such an agreement is not enforceable against the

23.
24.
25.
26.
States
(1958).
27.

Id. at §§4 (3), 5.
Id. at §12.
I. HALPERIN, supra note 8, at 177.
The relative advantages and disadvantages of each of these devices in the United
are discussed in 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTIcE §§3.79, 5.34
R. KEssLE., NEw YORK CLOSE CORPORATIONS 207 (1968).
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sociedad an6nima or persons who are not parties to the agreement.28 Under
this rule the validity of corporate action taken pursuant to a resolution adopted at a stockholders' meeting cannot be challenged on the grounds that
given stockholders voting in favor of the resolution did so in breach of a
stockholders' agreement. This is true even if the sociedad an6nima or persons
not parties to the agreement knew at the time of the adoption of the resolu29
tion that the agreement was being violated.
Argentine authorities disagree about whether a voting agreement is binding
upon the parties to it. 0 Those who believe such an agreement is not binding
upon the parties base their position on the existence of a public policy
favoring stockholder action only after full debate at a duly convened meeting,
a policy impinged upon by any agreement restricting voting freedom in advance of such a meeting3 1 Even those who argue for the validity of a voting
agreement admit that the only action available to an aggrieved party in the
event of breach of the agreement is one for damages, not one for specific
performance.32 In view of the difficulty of determining damages in such an
action, this remedy is unsatisfactory for an investor seeking to maintain control of the sociedad an6nimaY3

In the United States a stockholders' agreement is often the instrument
chosen for inclusion of restrictions on the transfer of the stock of the corporation owned by the parties to the agreement.3 4 In Argentina such an agreement is not specifically enforceable against the sociedad an6nima or the
person who purchases shares of stock transferred in violation of the agreement.39 Once the shares have been transferred, the sociedad an6nima may
treat the purchaser as the legal owner, and the purchaser has the right to
demand that he be listed as the stockholder of record in the corporate
books. 36 The only remedy available to an aggrieved party to the agreement
is an action for damages against the party who transferred the shares in violation of the agreement. This remedy is unsatisfactory for an investor who
entered a joint venture in the belief that he would not be forced to accept
the later participation of a party to whom he objects.
28. I. HALPERIN, supra note 8, at 129.
29. Id.; ADER, KLIKSBERG & KUTNOWSKI, SOCIEDADES COMMERCIALES 319 (1963).
30. At least one author feels a voting agreement is %alid in principle between the
parties to it on the grounds that it is not expressly prohibited by law. E. Zalvidar, note 19
supra.
31. 1. HALPERIN, supra note 8, at 130. An irrevocable proxy, to the extent that it
restricts the freedom of the stockholder to vote, would seemingly be invalid for the same
reason.
32. Id.

33. Although such agreements are not specifically enforceable, many joint venturers
enter into them anyway, each relying on the good faith of the other. See Note, International
joint Venture Corporations: Drafting of Control Arrangements, 1963

DUKE

L.J. 516, 527.

In view of the difficulty of determining damages, the parties may find it advisable to
insert a liquidated damages clause in the agreement.
34. 2 F. O'NFAL, supra note 26, at §7.07.
35. 1. HALPPRIN, supra note 8, at 130.
36. Spiguel, Restricciones a Ia Libre Trasmisibilidad de las Acciones, [1965-I] J.A.
(Secci6n Doctrina) 41.
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Voting Trust. Another control available in the United States is the
voting trust.3 7 In Argentina the voting trust does not exist. Since Argentina

has a civil law legal system, it does not recognize the distinction, which is
inherent in the common law division of law and equity, between legal and
equitable ownership,38 and such a distinction is indispensable for the existence of the voting trust.
A process of elimination leaves the charter and bylaws as control distribution devices available in Argentina. In the United States the practitioner
who is distributing control must choose carefully between the two because some provisions, such as those establishing high quorum and
voting requirements, may have to be included in the charter in order
to be valid. 39 In Argentina both of those documents must be recorded; therefore they have substantially the same legal effect. As a matter of
practice, most of the control mechanisms discussed in this article are usually
40
inserted in the bylaws.
CONTROL MECHANIsMS AVAILABLE IN ARGENTINA

In order to protect his minority investment in the sociedad an6nima,
while allowing the corporate management sufficient flexibility, the investor
will usually wish to attain at least the following four objectives: (1) the power
to veto action by the stockholders; (2) representation on the board of directors and, at times, the power to veto board action; (3) restrictions on the
transfer of the stock owned by the other stockholders to outsiders; and (4) the
protection from dilution of his proportionate capital interest.
Veto Power Over Stockholder Action. One common mechanism affording
a minority stockholder some control of the enterprise is the establishment of
high quorum and voting requirements for the validity of stockholder action.41
37. A group of stockholders create a voting trust by executing a trust instrument in
which they transfer the legal title to their stock to voting trustees and retain for themselves

the beneficial ownership. The trustees vote the stock in accordance with the terms of the
trust instrument. 1 F. O'NzAL, note 26 supra, §5.31.
38. P. EDER, PRINCIPIOS CARAGTEruSTICOS DEL "CoM MON LAw" Y DEL DRERCHo LATINOAMMECANA 83 (1960).
39. N.Y. Bus. CoaR. LAw II§616, 709 (McKinney 1963). This rule is a byproduct of the
fact that in the United States only the charter is required to be recorded, the bylaws being
treated as a private document. Since the certificate is recorded it constitutes constructive

notice to third parties. R. KEssrR, supra note 27, at 329.
40. A collection of forms for bylaws containing control mechanisms such as those
discussed in this article may be found in A. HEYDE GARRIGOS, LA SocIEDAD ANONIMA: CINCO
(1940). If a minority
stockholder owns 40% of the stock of the corporation, a requirement that a resolution at
a stockholders' meeting may be validly adopted only by the affirmative vote of 65% of
the voting stock gives the minority stockholder an effective veto over stockholder action.
41. For convenience, problems of control dealt with in this article will be discussed in
terms of one majority and one minority stockholder. In this regard, the reader should
bear in mind that Argentine law requires a minimum of ten stockholders throughout the
life of the corporation. Code of Commerce art, 318 (1967). For a discussion of this reEsTATuTos DIFERENTEs APLIcADOS A CINcO DISTANTAS SrTuACIONES
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Section 354 of the Code of Commerce provides that a quorum consisting of
stockholders representing three-fourths of the capital stock of the corporation
and the affirmative vote of stockholders representing one-half of the capital
stock are necessary for the validity of a stockholders' resolution in regard to
the following corporate actions requiring stockholder authorization: dissolution; extension of corporate existence; merger; reduction of capital; redemption or increase of authorized capital change in the corporate purpose;
and any other modification of the corporate charter. 42 This statute is manda4
tory and its requirements may not be made more lenient in the bylaws. 3
However, the bylaws may establish quorum and voting requirements identical
to or greater than those of section 354 in regard to matters not referred to
in that section.

44

If a minority stockholder has less than twenty-five per cent of the capital
stock, he cannot invoke section 354 to prevent the constitution of a valid
quorum and his votes will not be sufficient to prevent the adoption of a stockholder resolution. In this situation either the quorum or voting requirements,
or both, may be increased in the bylaws to provide the minority stockholder
with an effective veto power by making his attendance necessary for a quorum
45
and his votes necessary for passage of a resolution.
Representation on the Board of Directors. A veto power over stockholder
action will not assure a minority stockholder of control over the daily affairs
of the sociedad an6nima if the bylaws confer broad powers on the board of
directors and the minority stockholder has no power to elect a representative
to the board. Even if the minority stockholder is afforded the right to elect at
least one board member, he cannot assert any influence over decisions of the
board unless high quorum and voting requirements are established for the
validity of board action.
When a close corporation with only one class of stock is organized in the
United States, the stockholders often enter into an agreement to vote their
shares in favor of designated persons for election as directors of the corporation. 46 In the agreement the majority stockholders can undertake to elect as
quirement in relation to the fonnation of a wholly-owned subsidiary in South America see
Alyea, Subsidiary Corporations Under the Civil and Common Law, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1227
(1953).
42. In Argentina, quorum and voting requirements are based upon the amount of
capital represented at a stockholders' meeting rather than upon the number of stockholders
present. One author suggests that the bylaws could provide for quorum and voting requirements based upon the number of stockholders present, but this is the minority viewpoint. Vasquez y Morandi, El Voto Personal en las Asembleas de las Sociedades An6nimas,
66 La Ley 940 (1952). Thus, the bylaws could not provide that a specified stockholder,
designated by name, has the power to elect a specified number of directors. For a discussion of such a provision in the United States see I F. O'NEAL, note 26 supra, §5.02.
43. Union Cafieros Azucareros Villa Alberdi Ltda., Suprema Corte de Tucuman, 20
Instancia, 61 La Ley 303 (1951).
44. E.g., bulk sale of corporate assets, the issuance of stock, long-term loans, and
salaries to employees in excess of a stipulated amount.
45. 1 M. RIVAROLA, SOCIEDADES ANONIMAS 196 (1935).
46. A list of other typical situations covered in a stockholder's agreement in the
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a director a person nominated by a minority stockholder. Since an agreement
of this nature is not enforceable in Argentina, 47 it is difficult to give a minority stockholder representation on the board of directors if the sociedad
an6nima has only one class of stock. For this reason, when minority representation is desired by those forming the sociedad an6nima, the most common
approach used is the creation of two or more classes of stock, permitting the
minority stockholder to subscribe to a majority of the shares of a stock class
and providing in the bylaws that each class shall have the right to elect the
number of directors designated in the bylaws.48 In conjunction with these
provisions, the bylaws could specify that directors may be removed only by
stockholders of the class entitled to elect them.49 In this manner, the minority
stockholder would be assured of continuous representation on the board of
directors.
In the above situation the minority stockholder would not have voting
control of the board of directors since he could elect only two of five board
members. However, the bylaws could contain a provision that the affirmative vote of four of the board members is required for the validity of board
action.50 This would give the two board members elected by the minority
holder the right to exercise a veto power over board decisions.
In any given case, the minority stockholder may not be interested in representation on the board of directors, but may still want to exercise a veto
power over most major corporate decisions through his voting power as a
stockholder. This may be done by reserving to the stockholders the power to
make such decisions and, at the same time, establishing high quorum and
voting requirements for stockholder action.
The extent to which the board of directors may be stripped of power
varies from country to country. A suggestion has been made that a New
York statute permits almost total sterilization of the board of directors by insertion of the following provision in the certificate of incorporation: 51
All the functions and powers of the board of directors, and complete
management of this corporation, shall be vested exclusively in the
holders of the common stock of this corporation. The board of directors of this corporation shall have no power or authority whatsoever,
except that where by any law of this or any other state, the action or
approval of the board of directors is required, the board shall perform
United States may be found in 1 F. O'NEAL, note 26 supra, §5.01.

47. See text accompanying notes 27-36 supra.
48. If there are to be two stockholders in the corporation, one receiving 60% of the
stock and the other receiving 40%, the bylaws could provide for a Class A stock composed
of 60 shares and a Class B stock composed of 40 shares. Class A stockholders could then be
given the right to elect three members of a five-member board of directors and Class B
stockholders could have the right to elect the remaining two members. This approach is
suggested for use in Argentina in H. ALEGRIA, supra note 21, at 59.
49. The Inspeccion General presently demands such a provision by included in the
bylaws. Id. at 59.
50. An example of a bylaw provision of this type may be fQund in A. HEYDE GARRIGOS,
supra note 40, at 53.

51.

H. KMEssLR, supra note 27, at 152, 153,
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such act or grant such approval exactly as directed by the shareholders
acting in any manner permitted by law and this certificate of incorporation.
52
A provision of this type would probably not be allowed in Argentina
However, the bylaws may reserve most major corporate decisions to the
stockholders, leaving matters involving the ordinary course of business in
the hands of the board of directors. The stockholders may be given the power

to authorize the initial and subsequent issue of corporate stock5 3 mort-

gage and sell corporate property, 54 and determine the value of property given
as consideration for stock of the sociedad an6nima. 55 In addition, all the matters listed in section 354,56 including the right to increase the authorized
capital of the sociedad an6nima, are reserved to the stockholders.5
Control mechanisms included in the bylaws for the protection of the
minority stockholder will be of little value if the bylaws may be amended by
the majority stockholder without the consent of the former. Therefore, high
quorum and voting requirements should be made a condition precedent to the
amendment of the bylaws.58
Restrictions on Stock Transfer. In Argentina, nominative shares are ordinarily freely transferable by endorsement, and an absolute bar to their transfer would be invalid.5 9 As previously noted, restrictions on the transfer of
stock may not be enforced if included in a stockholders' agreement. However, reasonable restrictions may be placed upon the transfer of shares if
included in the corporate bylaws.60 The test of reasonableness is whether, as
a practical matter, the restrictions effectively bar transfer.61

52. The Argentine corporation statutes seem to contemplate a board of directors with
some powers of management. Code of Commerce art. 335 (1967).
53.

A. HEYDE GARRIGOS, LA PROTECCION

ESTATUTARIA

DEL

ACCIONIsrA

92 (1938).

54. Apparently these two powers are reserved to the stockholders unless conferred
upon the board of directors in the bylaws. I. HALI'ERIN, supra note 8, at 215.
55. A. HEYDE GARRiGOs, note 53 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 41-48 supra.
57. If a minority stockholder is not a director, the bylaws should specify the extent to
which he may inspect the books of the corporation because the right of a stockholder
to inspect the books is not absolute by statute. H. ALEGRIA, sUpra note 21, at 92.
58. Code of Commerce, art. 354 (1967), applies to the amendment of the bylaws, but if
greater quorum and voting requirements are desired they must be provided for in the
bylaws themselves.

59. Spiguel, supra note 36, at 42. Bear in mind that restrictions cannot be placed upon
the transfer of bearer shares because the essence of such shares is their transferability by
delivery. I. HALPERIN, supra note 8, at 126 n.54. Therefore, if such restrictions are desired,
the corporation will have to issue nominative shares.
60. Spiguel, supra note 36, at 42. However, such restrictions should be incorporated
into the bylaws originally for it is doubtful if they may be added by an amendment to the
bylaws. Id. at 47.
61. H. ALEGRIA, supra note 21, at 166. This test seems almost identical to the one
enunciated in Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d
418 (1957).
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The bylaws of the sociedad an6nima may provide that the corporate stock
may be transferred only upon the approval of the stockholders or the board
of directors. 62 Such approval may not be withheld arbitrarily since this would
render the transfer of the stock practically impossible. 63 If this type of restriction is utilized, the bylaws should place some limits on the discretion of the
stockholders or the board of directors in refusing approval of the transfer.
Another restriction recognized in Argentina is in the United States commonly called the "right of first refusal." 64 When this restriction is incorporated into the bylaws, the price at which the stock must be offered should
be specified and so should the time within which the offer of the selling
shareholder must be accepted.65 Since the offer to fellow stockholders is ordinarily made on a prorata basis, the bylaws should stipulate the procedure
to be followed in the event that not all of the stockholders purchase their
prorata share of the stock. 6
Restrictions included in the bylaws may be enforced against tranferees of
the stock, including the heirs of a deceased holder and those purchasing the
stock at a forced sale.67
Disagreement exists among Argentine scholars on the question of whether
a restriction contained in the bylaws will be effective against purchasers of
the stock if notice of the restriction is not contained on the share certificate.68
The bylaws in Argentina are a matter of public record and, theoretically, are
incorporated into the share certificate.69 In practice, however, the safer procedure would be to include some notice of the restriction on the face of the
certificate.
Protection Against Dilution. When an investor at the time of his investment receives a certain percentage of the capital stock of the corporation, he
often does not want this percentage to be subsequently decreased by the issue
0
of stock to persons other than himself.7
62. I. HALPERIN, supra note 8, at 166.
63. Id. at 127. In Rafe v. Hindin, 29 App. Div. 2d 481, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662 (2d Dep't
1968), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 759, 244 N.E.2d 469, 296 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1968), a restriction providing
that one of two stockholders could transfer his stock only with the consent of the other
was held to be illegal because there was no provision that consent could not be withheld
unreasonably. This would apparently be the rule in Argentina unless a court would read
into this type of restriction that consent could not be arbitrarily withheld.
64. Under this restriction, if a stockholder wishes to transfer his stock, he must first
offer it to his fellow stockholders. For a discussion of the validity of such a restriction in
the United States see 2 F. O'NFAL, supra note 26, at 13.
65. Spiguel, supra note 36, at 44.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 49, 50. However, there is an indication that the price agreed upon by the
decedent for the repurchase of his stock will not be binding upon his heirs unless it represents the equivalent of the investment made by the decedent. Id. at 46.
68. I. HAIXERIN, supra note 8, at 128.
69. H. ALEGRLU, supra note 21, at 60.
70. If a corporation has an authorized capital of 50 shares of common stock and the
investor is issued 10 of these shares, he has a 20% interest in the corporation. If the authorized capital is increased to 100 shares and the 50 new shares are issued to a person other
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If the bylaws confer preemptive rights upon the stockholders, then each
stockholder may preserve his proportionate interest in the sociedad an6nima
by purchasing his proportionate share of any new shares being issued by it.
However, even if the bylaws provide for preemptive rights, a majority stockholder may be able to prejudice the interest of a minority stockholder by
causing stock to be issued at a time when the minority stockholder does not
have funds available with which to exercise his preemptive rights.
If the stockholder wants to assure himself that his proportionate interest
in the sociedad an6nima will not be diluted, he should require that an increase of the authorized capital will be effected only with his consent. This
may be accomplished by having the power to veto stockholder action because
only the stockholders may amend the corporate charter to increase authorized
capital. In addition, the stockholder should obtain the power to prevent the
issue of any authorized but unissued stock by having a veto power over action
by the board of directors.
CONCLUSION

An American company making an equity investment in Argentina through
the vehicle of the sociedad an6nima may be willing to participate as a minority stockholder, but it will usually insist upon having a veto power over
corporate decisions. In Argentina, as in the United States, this power may be
obtained by use of high quorum and voting requirements coupled with
representation on the board of directors. The task of ultimately devising the
best scheme of corporate control will be within the province of the investor's
legal counsel. Although stockholders' agreements and the voting trust as
control distribution devices are not available in Argentina, the corporate
charter and bylaws may be molded to include the necessary quorum and
voting requirements. The American investor's counsel will always want to
seek the assistance of capable Argentine counsel before committing funds for
use in Argentina, and knowledge by the former of the control mechanisms and
distribution devices available in Argentina will provide a broad basis for
communication with the latter.

than himself, the investor only has a 10% interest in the corporation. Consequently, his
percentage of the dividends and his share of the corporation upon its liquidation will be
reduced 50%.
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